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Brexit’s “USS Indianapolis Moment” 
By Professor Alex de Ruyter, Director, Centre for Brexit Studies, 
Birmingham City University 
News this week that the UK Government had reiterated its intention 
not to seek an extension of the transition period of de facto EU 
membership had some pundits making reference to the manifest folly 
of a No Deal Brexit outcome coming on the tails of the devastation 
wrought on the UK economy by Covid-19. Marina Hyde, writing in the 
Guardian, likened it to the torpedoing of the USS Indianapolis by a 
Japanese submarine in 1945, during the closing stages of the Second 
World War.[1] 
For those that survived the attack, their terror was compounded by 
being stranded floating for days in the mid-Pacific, being subjected to 
the largest recorded shark attack in history[2]. The analogy here is 
clear, with Covid-19 being the torpedo attack reducing UK GDP by up 
to 35% over the coming months and then Brexit being the subsequent 
shark attacks on traumatised businesses facing the prospect of new 
trade barriers come January 1st 2021. 
Is this a fair comparison? Ostensibly, the Government’s logic – if it 
fails to establish a new trade agreement with the EU by the end of this 
year – is that it will in essence have reached a trade agreement with 
the United States and possibly other key countries (i.e., China). 
Leaving aside the probabilities of these for now, at this point it is 
useful to recap where “negotiations” with the EU currently stand. With 
face-to-face negotiations having been suspended due to the 
Coronavirus outbreak (with chief negotiator for the EU, Michel Barnier 
having tested positive for Covid-19 but now recovered), 
videoconferences in the weeks beginning April 20 (this week), May 11 
and June 1 have substituted. 
Suffice to say, it is difficult to see how any meaningful progress could 
be achieved in such a format, with the exchange of any substantive 
legal texts (necessary for a trade agreement to come into force) being 
particularly problematic. Moreover, the EU – which has a vaster 
negotiating capacity and expertise in trade matters than the UK – is 
itself struggling to maintain dialogue in external negotiations whilst 
having to deal with the Covid-19 outbreak across member states. 
The UK in turn has been hamstrung by the savage cuts imposed on 
the Civil Service over the past ten years by the Conservatives (alone 
and in coalition with the Liberal Democrats), with some 80,000 
jobs[3] having been culled between 2010 and 2016 – only partially 
offset by a frantic recruitment drive post-Referendum (some 30,000 
positions). 
With the Covid-19 outbreak diverting attention away from other 
functions, it is fair to say that the UK Civil Service will struggle with this 
timetable – and that’s being optimistic. No serious pundit expected 
that the UK Government could simultaneously conduct trade 
negotiations with the EU and the United States and have it done and 
dusted by the end of the year, and that was before the advent of the 
Coronavirus. 
And what of ‘negotiations’ with the US? In contrast to the highly 
publicised, politicised talks with the EU, these have been 
conducted sotto vocé – not surprising given the demands of the US 
Government to give access to American farmers[4] and US Big 
Pharma to the NHS, in effect increasing the price for drugs by 
lengthening US patent rights. After Covid-19 would a British public 
really be in a mood to tolerate the price of prescription drugs doubling 
under such an agreement?[5] 
However, it might be premature of me to speculate. After all, in the 
midst of an election year, Trump’s only priority is to get himself re-
elected (with an election strategy centred on blaming China, 
foreigners in general and Democrat state Governors for the Covid-19 
outbreak in the US), so trade talks with the UK are not uppermost in 
his mind. 
In any event such an agreement faces further hurdles in order to 
come into effect.[6] Whilst President Trump and his team can 
negotiate a trade agreement, in order to be legally binding, it needs to 
be approved by the US Congress, and Democrat control of the House 
of Representatives may prove to be a major stumbling block. 
Add to that the prospect of a possible victory by Joe Biden for the 
Democrats in the presidential run-off and the scenario emerges of a 
wrecking ball President-elect Biden scuppering the whole agreement, 
as he has been attested to alluding to. We may well say a trade 
agreement with the US looks a long way off, if indeed it ever comes to 
life… 
To the other great post-Brexit trade agreement hope, China, the 
current Covid-19 context has seriously undermined the logic of 
pursuing a trade agreement, even more so where the prospect 
emerges of Chinese corporate interests bidding for UK national 
strategic business assets (IT, automotive, etc.) rendered vulnerable 
by furloughing the economy, emerges. 
This has not been lost on Tory MPs[7]. Add to this allegations that 
Trump is pressuring Raab et al. into a stronger stance on 
China[8] and the prospects look grim. In any event there are serious 
practical impediments to a trade agreement here (e.g., animal welfare 
standards). 
Where then does this leave the UK at the end of this year if the 
Government insist on the current Brexit timetable? At the legal default 
setting of “no deal” and reversion to WTO trade thresholds. And with 
no major trade agreements in place (only the grandfathering of 
existing EU trade agreements with countries that the UK conducts 
little trade with. 
Do the Government really think that after the Covid-19 torpedoing of 
the UK economy that the UK voting public will swallow a no-deal 
shark attack Brexit as trivial in comparison? After all, what’s a few 








[4] There is, unsurprisingly, pressure from the UK’s farming sector to 
halt negotiations: https://www.fginsight.com/news/news/us-trade-talks-
must-be-halted-to-deal-with-pandemic-demand-campaigners–107370 
[5]The next election is a long way off, but being seen to undermine the 
NHS at such a time could be an election-loser even from this distance 
(especially because a vaccine is, to all practical intents and purposes, 
likely to be 18 months+ away and is not an inevitability). Even in the 
event that treatments get much better, we’re still talking about a 
disease that will potentially hospitalise hundreds of thousands in the 
UK over time. 
[6] Leaving aside for now that the actual benefits of such an 
agreement to the UK are trivial in comparison to lost trade with the 
EU. The Government’s own estimates suggest only a 0.16% boost to 
UK GDP, in contrast to the “4.9 – 6.7 per cent hit to the economy in 
the event of a Canada-style free trade agreement with the EU (7.7 – 
9.3 per cent in the case of no 
deal).” https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/uk/2020/03/why-did-
government-release-us-uk-trade-negotiations-mandate-today 
[7] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/12/uk-spy-agencies-
urge-china-rethink-once-covid-19-crisis-is-over 
[8] https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/uk-lockdown-coronavirus-
plan_uk_5e98b134c5b6ead14009d929?guccounter=1&guce_referrer
=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZWNvc2lhLm9yZy8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAA
AMZL3fHoYrUr2_-
R29cIVT0by_8G4eehxRjGa_CgTtAYs4HJsazZ3gfSdnIFbiFBe3i5-
Bfka8-1rtorIgkOg8ALk1AyKN-
9N2wrTrLYQmjv9JWgVsz6gQdB8ttP0jkTBz_g17cyhAnhrYa9LG41Ak
H0BaOvahgTy0IdQ5uyo-F8 
 
